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Abstract: The article aims to apply the insights of Contest Theory to al 
Qaeda’s recruitment process. From this point of view, al Qaeda can be 
considered as a contest organizer rewarding an indivisible prize – namely, 
official membership and economic rewards – to candidate extremists 
groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each other to prove 
their commitment and ability. Candidate terrorist groups compete by 
maximizing their efforts to win the prize, i.e. maximizing the number of 
casualties. Eventually, al Qaeda reaps the benefits of the most successful 
attacks in the form of a huge return in terms of image, while paying a 
limited price. This model also has important policy implications for counter-
terrorism. Firstly, as al Qaeda’s main incentive to prompt competition is 
spreading a common knowledge about the entity of the prize, action should 
be undertaken in order to falsify and confuse the kind of information that 
aspirant terrorists receive. Secondly, since al Qaeda’s reward is as 
ideological as economic, efforts should be dedicated to tracking down and 
possibly halt financial flows before they are used to reward the applicants. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this article is to analyze al Qaeda’s modus operandi in light of 
the economic theory of contests. From this point of view, al Qaeda can be 
considered a contest organizer rewarding an indivisible prize – which we 
assume to be official membership and economic rewards. The contest is 
then joined by candidate terrorist groups that compete by maximizing their 
efforts to win the prize, i.e. maximizing the number of casualties. As we will 
see, this logic has various pros and some cons. In order to devise an 
effective counterstrategy, governments should target the key elements of 
this contest: al Qaeda’s communication strategy and the setting of the prize. 
This article is divided into three sections. The next paragraph will 
describe al Qaeda’s main features according to the prevailing literature. 
Section two presents some insights drawn from the economic theory of 
contests, in order to account for al Qaeda’s relationship with its cells. 
Finally, section three will briefly discuss some tentative strategies for 
counter-terrorism. 
 
Why is al Qaeda different from previous terrorist organizations? 
When compared to traditional terrorist groups, al Qaeda displays several 
novel elements . Among its defining features, Audrey Kurt Cronin suggests 
four main characteristics: (a) fluid organization, (b) methods of recruitment, 
(c) financing instruments and (d) the use of communication media1. While 
all of them are relevant when it comes to framing a sound counterstrategy, 
for the purposes of our analysis it is critical to focus our attention 
exclusively on the way al Qaeda cells are related and interact with each 
other – i.e. the organizational dimension as broadly conceived. 
                                                 
1 Kurth Cronin (2006, pp. 32-39). 
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It is this feature that makes terrorists so difficult to hunt down. 
Indeed, thanks to the flexibility embedded in its structure, al Qaeda is 
continuously evolving. In fact, rather than being an organization, al Qaeda 
comes closer to the original meaning of its name – i.e. a concept, an idea, a 
mission2. In order to describe its specificity, analysts have coined a plethora 
of terms: network, group, movement, clique – in other words, anything 
denoting a flexible structure with fuzzy boundaries3. Considering al Qaeda 
as a network is not only in line with recent empirical findings4, but is also 
helpful in understanding the principles and the logic underlying its 
functioning.  
For the whole network, the lack of a clear hierarchical line of 
command that is inherent in such a structure5 results in flexibility and 
autonomy as well as in resilience to penetration and compromise6. In 
particular, this flexibility allows for a novel recruitment system , which is 
clearly crucial when considering al Qaeda’s survival and spread on a world-
wide scale. In fact, some recent work suggests that the recruiting process 
may now resemble a kind of voluntary application to join the organization7. 
In this view, new groups are involved in the organization as the result of a 
selection process amongst different volunteers8. The rise of the so-called 
“self starters”9 is taken as evidence of this, i.e. groups with little or no 
affiliation with the network perpetrating terrorist attacks on their own 
initiative. This allows al Qaeda to extend its membership almost infinitely, 
simply because new groups can be affiliated at any time without an 
                                                 
2 As noted by many commentators, the original meaning of al Qaeda is essentially 
“the base”, “the foundation”, or even “the method” – which underlines the 
organization’s catalyst role among different groups. 
3 Coll, Glasser (2005). 
4 Sageman (2004). 
5 Jackson (2006, pp. 247-48) 
6 For an in-depth discussion of networks see Arquilla, Ronfeldt (2001). 
7 Cozzens (2005). 
8 Sageman (2004, p. 110). 
9 Kirby (2007); Sageman (2008)  
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institutionalized recruitment procedure. Although this may be conjecture, it 
is assumed that the number of potential applicants is much higher than the 
promised membership. This situation is especially beneficial for al Qaeda 
for at least three reasons. Firstly, there is no need for bin Laden and his 
fellows to invest resources in any recruitment drives. Secondly, and most 
importantly, such an abundance of applications would allow al Qaeda to be 
very selective in granting membership. The only weakness of the self-
starters system is that, by virtue of the spontaneous origins of would-be 
terrorists, the command and control capabilities are quite limited. As a side 
effect, therefore, al Qaeda could be cited and get stuck in actions far from 
the leaders’ main interests. Secondly, and partially related to this last point, 
the potential of ideology as a common denominator should not be 
exaggerated, as the ideological appeal is a necessary, but hardly sufficient 
condition. 
Proceeding in this direction, in the next paragraph we turn to the 
contribution of the economic theory of contests. In fact, it could be a useful 
theoretical framework to analyze how candidate groups voluntarily exert 
efforts in order to get involved in the Al Qaeda network.  
It is worth noting that in recent times a different interpretation has 
been proposed. It has been argued that terrorist cells behave according to an 
open-source mechanism, but this seems incorrect to us 10. This interpretation 
mainly focuses on the structure of the network: terrorists would be akin to 
developers of a free Linux-style software. There are some factors which 
could make this interpretation fitting: (a) the lack of a rigid hierarchical 
structure; (b) the de-centralized organization of the network; (c) the 
initiative of developers; (d) the spontaneous elitist evolution of contributors. 
However, there are some other factors which make such an interpretation 
incorrect. Needless to say, in an open-source mechanism, co-developers 
                                                 
10 The open-source interpretation of Al Qaeda is in Robb (2007). We are grateful to 
Jurgen Brauer for bringing the issue to our attention. 
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produce a public good11. They can consume this public good and such 
consumption positively enters the utility function of both developers and 
users. By contrast, terrorist cells produce a public bad12. They cannot 
consume the good itself and it cannot enter positively any utility function . 
Looking at the organization of the structure, there are also some characters 
there that limit this kind of interpretation. In the open-source mechanism, a 
developer faces a publicly available opportunity cost to her or his time. 
While developing an open-source project, he or she must give up the 
development of other projects. This is possible because programming skills 
are pervasive and simply signaled. Therefore, developers clearly face an 
opportunity cost which is public information. This seems not to be the case 
with terrorists. Since terrorism is a secret activity by definition, terrorists 
would not be engaged in other activities. Terrorist skills are not pervasive 
and, in most cases, they cannot be disclosed. The opportunity cost faced by 
candidate terrorists is private information. 
Last but not least, in an open-source structure, developers can 
communicate and interact with each other. This does not seem to be the case 
with terrorist networks. It has been shown that, unlike conventional social 
networks, terrorist networks do not need to experience frequent and dense 
communication. Rather, in most cases ties and connections are activated 
only when they are assumed to be necessary13. 
However, potential fruitful insights that could be still drawn from 
open-source interpretation relate to the motivations of developers. Open-
source is characterized by two distinct incentives leading to delayed 
payoffs: (i) a career concern incentive, namely the ‘bid’ on future well-paid 
job offers. (ii) The peer-recognition (something akin to academic research). 
                                                 
11 See Lerner, Tirole (2002).  
12 A ‘public bad’ is a diffused negative externality recalling the idea of 
‘atmosphere’ externality as developed by Meade (1952). 
13 See Krebs (2002); Brams, Mutlu, Ramirez (2006).  
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They both fall under the heading of signalling incentive, which – according 
to Lerner and Tirole – strongly relies on: (a) the highest possible visibility of 
performance to the relevant audience, (b) the highest possible impact of 
effort on performance, and (c) the highest perceived causality between 
performance and talent.  
However, these elements do also fit with Contest Theory, which is 
expounded in the next paragraph. 
 
Some insights from Contest Theory 
Drawing on Contest Theory we now try to elucidate some conditions and 
the logic that may underlie al Qaeda’s peculiar recruiting process. There is a 
growing awareness among economists and other social scientists that many 
phenomena can be modelled as contests. A contest is commonly defined as 
a game in which players compete for a prize by making irreversible outlays. 
In other words, contests are situations in which rational agents spend 
resources in order to win a prize. The characteristic feature of this 
interaction is that resources are spent irreversibly. This does constitute the 
main difference with auctions, in which agents do not bear the cost of the 
bids entirely by themselves. This is also the rationale for labelling contests 
as all-pay auctions14. 
Literature on contests commonly implies the concept of Nash 
equilibrium. A strategy is assumed to be a Nash equilibrium when no player 
involved has any incentive to deviate from it. The emergence of a Nash non-
cooperative equilibrium commonly occurs when agents have no opportunity 
for coordination. This is the classical case of the prisoner’s dilemma, i.e. 
where actors choose their favourite strategy even though it may lead to a 
                                                 
14 Traditional contest models are formally grounded on Tullock (1980), and found 
seminal explanations in O’Keeffe, Viscusi, Zeckhauser (1984); Rosen (1986); 
Dixit (1987). The first and seminal application has been developed by Tullock 
(1980) for rent-seeking phenomena. 
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sub-optimal result, because they are not able to coordinate. The lack of 
coordination leads to a non-cooperative equilibrium. In other words, as 
rational agents, they maximize their expected payoff. Although it seems 
trivial, the concept of maximizing agents becomes fundamental while 
analysing agents’ behaviour in contests. Consider two simple examples. In a 
race, athletes cannot coordinate their actions. In the presence of an 
indivisible prize (call this winner-take-all contest) they will put in their 
maximum effort to win the prize. In such a case, coordination is clearly not 
feasible. Only one player can win. There is no alternative strategy. Agents 
play à la Nash and maximize their efforts in order to maximize their 
payoffs. In a similar fashion, scholars competing for research grants cannot 
coordinate with each other. When grants are assigned on a personal basis 
and there is no opportunity to agree on a pre-determined sharing of the 
‘cake’, the only feasible strategy is to write the best possible proposal. 
Hereafter we mention some common findings of contest literature 
that might be useful for our analysis. In particular, in our framework we are 
interested in accounting for agents’ behavior and efforts. 
To begin with, the level of the effort made by every agent is strictly 
correlated to the value of the ‘prize’ – i.e. the higher the evaluation of the 
‘prize’, the higher the commitment to put the maximum effort into the 
contest will be. Second, each agent knows that the probability of winning 
the contest is increasing in its own effort and decreasing in other players’ 
efforts. That is, in the simplest case of two agents, A and B, the probability 
of agent A of winning the contest is higher when it makes a bigger effort 
than agent B. Therefore, the only feasible strategy for both A and B will be 
exerting the maximum possible effort. This way, each player can attain 
maximum payoff. To recapitulate this point, Contest Theory predicts that 
maximizing behaviour is the strategy used by each agent. This can also be 
generalized in the presence of a higher number of contestants. In a multi-
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agent scenario, however, the theory also predicts that total effort decreases 
in the number of contestants.  
That is, when agents are aware that the contest is joined by more 
agents, individual effort will decrease. By the same token, the sum of all 
individual efforts increases .  
Of course, these general predictions about agents’ behaviour can be 
considered as ceteris paribus conditions. In general, these properties hold 
even when other factors impact the effectiveness of efforts. For expository 
reasons, we can say that it is possible to indicate two candidate subsets of 
interacting factors: (a) individual characteristics; (b) exogenous 
characteristics.  
As individual characteristics, consider first the existence of different 
talents and abilities. Individuals as well as groups differ widely in terms of 
abilities. The idea of ability is ‘somehow’ technological. If you consider that 
a contest can be considered nothing but a production function of a monetary 
reward, then the efforts do constitute the ‘inputs’, whilst the abilities do 
constitute a technology translating a certain level of efforts into the 
probability of success. The impact of different abilities is clearer in the 
presence of a winner-take-all contest. Take again the example of the race. 
Since athletes are expected to put their maximum effort into the race, and 
given that their level of effort depends upon the value of the prize, they 
would make the same effort. In such a case, the outcome of the contest will 
be determined – everything else being equal – by abilities. Of course, 
abilities can be exogenously given and refer to personal talents given by 
nature, but they can also be related to some specific positive investments 
made by agents. Still, whatever the case, this does not really matter while 
analysing a contest. If they are not able to update their own abilities at 
different stages of the game, their efforts will be fruitless. 
As exogenous conditions, consider the design of the contest. That is, 
the agent providing the ‘prize’ of the contest can somehow modify the 
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architecture of the contest in order to influence the total effort exerted. The 
simplest case is that of providing different prizes. This is commonly the case 
with sport contests where prizes are offered for the winner but also for the 
runner-up. Moldovanu and Sela15 offer a brilliant theoretical contribution in 
this respect. They show that in the presence of concave cost functions, only 
one prize is the optimal design which does maximize efforts. By contrast, in 
the presence of convex cost functions, different prizes may constitute an 
optimal design. Put differently, when the efforts are increasingly costly – 
that is when the cost increases as the contest goes on – different prizes do 
constitute an optimal choice for the design. In fact, when rational agents 
know that several prizes are provided – given the information available 
about other contestants’ abilities – they will put their maximum effort into 
the contest. In fact, even if they are aware that they cannot win the contest, 
they also expend the maximum effort to get the other prizes. This is the case 
in sports such as cycling, where different prizes are provided by organizers 
and then the total efforts of participants is maximized. By contrast, when the 
cost function is not convex –does not increase with the effort – only one 
prize leads to the best design. In such a case, the designer’s objective is also 
maintained. The level of total effort is maximized. Offering only one prize 
guarantees that no player will give up. This is true in particular when 
players do not have information about other contestants’ abilities. 
The few lines above were based on the implicit assumption that 
agents involved in a contest are symmetric apart from their own abilities. A 
difference in abilities clearly recalls an idea of ‘asymmetry’ that is common 
among students of political science. Asymmetry however can take different 
shapes. In the realm of strategic interactions, what is also affecting agents’ 
behaviour is asymmetry in terms of available information. 
                                                 
15 Moldovanu, Sela (2001). 
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The simplest case refers to asymmetry in the evaluation of the prize. That is, 
without any public disclosure, agents can evaluate the ‘prize’ of a contest 
differently. Since the level of effort is positively correlated to the value of 
the prize, different evaluations of the stake lead to different levels of effort 
made by agents16. Nti analyses the case of a contest where participants 
evaluate the ‘prize’17 differently. The common result of this analysis is that 
agents that evaluate the stakes more highly make a bigger effort in the 
contest than low-evaluation participants. In particular, Hillman and Riley 
show that asymmetric evaluation deters participation by low-evaluation 
agents. Consider a contest with only two players, A and B, with identical 
abilities. If A retains a higher evaluation of the prize, it will exert itself 
more, and as a consequence will be the favorite. Agent B, the ‘Underdog’, 
will exert itself less. Therefore, increasing the favourite’s valuation 
increases its effort, but decreases the effort of the underdog. This result may 
hold even if Agent B (the low-evaluation agent) has superior abilities. 
In other words, this states that asymmetry in the evaluation of the 
prize can be a driving force. To sum up, some inferences drawn from 
Contest Theory may apply to our framework: 
 
1. All players maximize their own effort; 
2. in the presence of asymmetry in the evaluation of the prize, low 
evaluation players may give up; 
3. low ability players may also give up; 
4. the probability of cooperation among players is very low;18 
 
                                                 
16 Hillman, Riley (1989). 
17 Nti (1999); Nti, (2004). 
18 However, the possibility of collusion between heterogeneous agents in a contest 
has been analyzed in Caruso (2008). 
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How does al Qaeda fit into the theory expounded above? In this view, al 
Qaeda may be portrayed as a contest organizer providing an indivisible 
prize to the best terrorist group. From time to time, bin Laden and his 
fellows may start a competition among groups loosely related to the 
network. The prize could be assumed to be some sort of ideological blessing 
(being accepted as a full and honourable member of the organization) as 
well as economic reward19. More important than that, for our purposes, are 
the insights that we can get from Contest Theory on the way these candidate 
cells compete with each other. 
The key feature shaping this process is given by information. In a 
sense, the term relates to the fact that all the participants are privately 
informed about their abilities – in other words, each groups knows how 
much it can achieve, but is unaware of the others’ potential. This, in turn, 
creates a favourable condition for the contest designer, since all groups are 
forced to give their best and maximize their efforts. In a second sense, 
information can be seen as the process used by groups to signal their 
commitment and ability (and, conversely, as the way bin Laden monitors 
their actions). When it comes to terrorist attacks, monitoring and 
information costs are close to zero: in fact, when a terrorist group bombs an 
embassy or a trade centre with dozens of casualties somewhere in the world, 
the event is extensively broadcast by international mass media20. As a result, 
the link between effort and rewards is quite direct: the greatest effort is 
supposed to guarantee the prize. Or, put differently, each group knows that 
in order to win the prize it will have to maximize the number of casualties. 
Moreover, since the groups can evaluate the prize to be rewarded 
                                                 
19 It is established that al Qaeda has given grants to local groups that devised 
promising plans for attacks. See on the point Bruce Hoffman (2003). 
20 In a recent article Rohner and Frey demonstrated empirically that media attention 
and terrorism do mutually Granger cause each other,. See Rohner and Frey (2007).  
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differently, a spontaneous partitioning between high-ability and low-ability 
groups is to be expected.  
The implication of such logic is twofold. On the one hand, contrary 
to common wisdom, mass killing and the resulting psychological effect is 
not an end in itself, but rather a means for aspiring groups to win al Qaeda’s 
prize. In this view, target selection – as in the case of train stations, malls 
and hotels – is not just the consequence of ideological considerations, but  
rather a matter of tactical calculation: these sites host hundreds of appealing 
targets, are easy to strike, and highly visible in terms of media coverage. A 
second implication is that, according to the model, a terrorist action per se is 
not enough to automatically grant membership. Eventually, as a sort of ex 
post franchising21, al Qaeda reaps the benefits of the most successful attacks 
in the form of a huge return in terms of image, while paying – all things 
considered – a very limited price. 
 
Conclusion 
In the previous paragraphs, we attempted to apply insights drawn from 
Contest Theory to explain some of al Qaeda’s most puzzling features. As 
witnessed by the plots unveiled in London and Glasgow in July 2007, 
terrorist actions look more like the result of self-starters’ initiatives than 
elaborate, centralized, top-down plans. This practice represents a departure 
from the past – and a truly problematic one. In fact, from a counter-
terrorism perspective, the rise of autonomous violence-prone groups found 
Western intelligence basically unprepared. In the words of the British 
Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report, ‘We remain concerned that 
across the whole of the counter-terrorism community the development of the 
                                                 
21 See Farah, Finn (2003); Benjamin( 2003). 
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home-grown threat and the radicalization of British citizens were not fully 
understood or applied to strategic thinking’22. 
When explaining al Qaeda’s recruitment process, Contest Theory 
also sheds some light on the role of information and communication in 
connecting the various nodes which constitute the structure of al Qaeda’s 
network. The meaning of communication is usually conceived broadly, and 
it merely refers to the use of mass media or the Internet by bin Laden and 
his fellows. Mastering advanced technologies proved critical in al Qaeda’s 
ability to talk to multiple audiences – like potential new members, hostile 
governments and public opinions worldwide. However, this perspective 
blurs the line between internal and external communication. The model 
provided by Contest Theory, on the other hand, unveils the relevance of the 
internal front of communication – i.e. the way information circulates among 
various bodies of the organization. As mentioned, for bin Laden most of the 
advantages of starting contests derive from asymmetrical information: in 
fact, collusion among competing groups is hindered by a lack of knowledge 
of each others’ abilities and motivations; likewise, scarce information on the 
criteria used to allocate the prize forces competing groups to maximize their 
effort. On the other hand, there are also some weaknesses implicit in this 
system: the logic of group competition inherent in contests makes sense 
only under certain conditions, such as private and asymmetric information. 
Moreover, even though so far this process has appeared to be self-
sustaining, action can be undertaken in order to make it ineffective. 
Consequently, the policy prescriptions that emerge from our analysis 
lead to two broad courses of action. The first one is to discredit bin Laden’s 
promise. Or, in more sophisticated terms, to falsify and confuse the kind of 
information that terrorist candidates receive. In fact, the implicit assumption 
of any contest is that the organiser will certainly reward the winner. So, the 
                                                 
22 Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report into 
the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, May 2006. 
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success of a contest rests to a large extent upon trust. Undermining  the trust 
extremist candidates feel would presumably weaken the process of 
recruitment. Perhaps it is up to the intelligence community to perform this 
task. In fact, secret services may adopt different instruments to interfere 
with al Qaeda’s communication. However, this is a very sensitive issue, 
since evidently the risk involved in some intelligence practices for 
democratic countries is to disregard individual freedoms in favour of public 
security23. Terrorist violence would certainly not be eradicated, but it would 
be much harder for bin Laden to sustain the credibility of the contest among 
groups with its deadly impact on targets.  
The second prescription concerns funding. Needless to say, insofar 
as bin Laden’s reward to self-starters is monetary, hindering al Qaeda’s 
capacity to redistribute funds becomes a critical issue. This can be done by 
breaking down the flow of money at the lowest level of the chain – i.e. 
before it gets into local groups’ hands. If counter-terrorism can deny them 
their economic reward, bin Laden’s credibility as a contest organizer will be 
challenged. Then, counter-terrorism would have to track financial flows in 
order to prevent local groups from enjoying rewards for their actions. 
Apparently, the insights suggested in our analysis are limited by the 
lack of reliable information on the network. In other words, since no public 
confession or statement has been made by al Qaeda operatives on bin 
Laden’s rewarding strategy, we have to focus exclusively on the output of 
the process – obviously, al Qaeda’s attacks. As a consequence of this limit, 
several paths for future research are open. In particular, future analyses 
should investigate in depth the terms of the contest. How does bin Laden 
initiate a contest? How does he reward the successful applicants – i.e. what 
weight do ideological blessing and monetary remuneration24 carry? Is the 
                                                 
23 Wilkinson (2000). 
24 In fact, whenever the agents are partitioned into status categories according to 
their performance (top-class, low-class, and so on), a reasonable hypothesis is that 
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contest entered into by several participants simultaneously, or do applicants 
play sequentially until bin Laden’s goal is achieved? Finally, how does one 
jam or deter this strategy? 
Admittedly, these questions are beyond the limits of our analysis. 
Perhaps, addressing these questions will require refining – not to mention 
amending –the interpretation presented here.  
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